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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. ] 
ROY BENJAMIN HOSKINS, ; 
Defendant / Appellant. ] 
) BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
) Court of Appeals Case No. 20031008-CA 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S) PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue(s) for Review. (1) Is the trial court's determination that prior felony 
convictions of a government witness were inadmissible incorrect as a matter of law? (2) 
If the determination was in error, given the available evidence, was there a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant? 
Standard of Review. "Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a 
question of law, [the appellate court] review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
specific evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165, 1167 
(Utah 2003). If evidence has been improperly admitted or excluded, the appellate court 
"will not reverse a conviction unless the error is substantial and prejudicial in the sense 
1 
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that there is a reasonable likelihood that in [the error's] absence there would have been a 
more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 
1989). 
Preservation of the Argument. The Defendant filed his second Motion in Limine 
on/about November 11-12, 2003. R.36-37. The evidentiary hearing was held 12-3-2003 
before the Honorable William W. Barrett. R.164 p.l. The trial court issued its ruling on 
that same date. R.164 p.24-25. 
III. RELEVANT STATUTES 
A. Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution: 
(set forth in Defendant's Brief at page 2). 
B. Article L section 12, Utah State Constitution: 
(set forth in Defendant's Brief at page 2). 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 ("Definitions") (3) & (I I): 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
* * * * 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
* * * * 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ. 
D. Utah Code Ann. $ 76-5-102 ("Assault"): 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
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another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes 
bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; * * * *. 
E. Utah Rule of Evidence OJRE) 609: 
(set forth in Defendant's Brief at page 2). 
IV. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS _ _ _ 
The City submits the following statement of facts. 
1. This matter came before the Court on December 3, 2003 for motions and jury 
trial. R. 164 p. 1. 
2. Plaintiff was represented by Scott A. Fisher, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor. 
R.164. 
3. Defendant was represented by W. Andrew McCullough, Attorney for defendant. 
R.164. 
MOTIONS********************************^ 
4. The trial court granted the first defense motion to limit reference to a prior 
altercation as a "prior disagreement" during this trial. R.164 p.2. 
5. The trial court granted the second defense motion in part. This allowed the 
defense to inquire into the methamphetamine addiction of the city's victim witness, but 
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did not allow the defense to venture into testimony about different aspects of meth 
addiction more appropriate for expert testimony. R. 164 p.4. 
6. Counsel for the City did indicate to the court that consideration of prior felonies 
was subject to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 164 p.6. 
7. The City's victim witness Lee Charles Wanlass was sworn and questioned by 
Mr. McCullough. R. 164 p. 11. 
8. Mr. Wanlass testified that he had been charged with felony theft in 1999, and 
that charge was reduced to a class A misdemeanor. R. 164 p. 11. 
9. Mr. Wanlass testified the 1999 theft involved theft from a building of a camera 
worth $700, that he did not actually steal the camera(s), that he was the one caught with 
the camera(s) in his possession, and that he knew they were stolen. R.164 p. 12. 
10. Mr. Wanlass testified that he entered pleas to four third-degree burglaries in 
September 2000. Those pleas were for burglaries that occurred at the same time in July 
i 
2000 at "Diamond Storage". R. 164 p. 13. 
11. Mr. Wanlass testified that he entered four separate storage units using bolt 
cutters to take locks off, one of which was his own, that tools and "other off-the-wall < 
things like that" were taken out of those storage units. R. 164 p. 14. 
12. Mr. Wanlass testified that he had not tried to get rid of any of the stolen items 
at the time he was caught (one day to two weeks later). R. 164 p. 15. 
13. Mr. Wanlass testified that his purpose in taking the items was "to get money to 
I 
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help the pay bills and do some drugs." R. 164 p. 15. 
14. On this basis, the trial court referred to the burglaries as an act of dishonesty. 
R.164p.24. 
15. At the same time, the trial court engaged in a prejudicial/probative balancing 
analysis: "Is it going to be prejudicial to [Mr. Wanlass]? I think the fact that he's coming 
out in chains and a - 1 think I'm not going to allow any of that. I'll let you ask him about 
the joyride, the details about that. I think otherwise there's enough prejudice when he 
walks out in a jumpsuit with handcuffs on that I don't want to take it any further than 
that." The trial court later reiterated: "But, you know, I've got to kind of weigh the 
prejudice here, and, you know, I think the prejudice is high when he walks out with 
handcuffs on in a jumpsuit, and I don't want to exacerbate that any more than is 
necessary, although I will allow you to get into the '01 case where he knew it was a stolen 
vehicle." R. 164 p.24-25 (emphasis added). 
16. At the time Mr. Wanlass was testifying, he was in jail on probation violation. 
R.164p.l5. 
17. Mr. Wanlass was in jail on a probation violation to his 2001 guilty plea to 
felony "receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle". He testified his sole connection to the 
stolen vehicle had been his day planner which was found in it by police. He testified that 
he pled guilty because he "had no choice", and that he was going to be found guilty "no 
matter what". R. 164 p. 16-17. 
5 
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18. Mr. Wanlass was also in jail on a probation violation to a car theft conviction 
from the previous year. He testified that he had been stopped by police driving a car he'd 
gotten from his brother-in-law, did not know it was stolen, that he had been at a funeral 
and his brother-in-law had been too drunk to drive. R. 164 p. 17. 
19. Mr. Wanlass indicated that he'd pled guilty to that charge because the only 
thing he was being charged with was being in possession of a stolen vehicle. R.164 p. 18. 
20. Mr. Wanlass testified that he had also pled guilty in 2002 to a 2001 joyriding 
case. He was driving a truck while moving, he had gotten the truck from a friend, and he 
did know it was stolen when he got it from his friend. R.164 p. 18. The trial court 
indicated that this was "the only one that I can really pinpoint as something that would 
involve dishonesty . . . where he said he knew that the vehicle was stolen and he kept it 
anyway." R.164 p.24. 
21. The trial court also allowed the defense to ask Mr. Wanlass about the two 
violations for which he was then incarcerated. R. 164 p.25. 
22. The city's witness Jess Lee Garcia II was also sworn and testified. R.164 p.21. 
23. Mr. Garcia testified that he was in jail custody for two stolen vehicles, 
joyriding, concealing a dangerous weapon, and possession of paraphernalia. He indicated 
that he had not been convicted of the stolen-vehicle offenses, which were still pending. 
He indicated that he had been convicted of the theft crime of joyriding about eight months 
before. R.164 p.22. He also indicated that the possession of paraphernalia charge and 
6 
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concealing a dangerous weapon charge were not convictions and were still pending as 
well.R.164p.23. 
24. Mr. Garcia indicated that a friend of his girlfriend had stolen her mom's car, 
and let him borrow it. He initially thought it was not stolen, and then found out at a party 
that it was stolen. He went to return it, "popped" a tire while doing so, and encountered 
police at that time. He plead guilty to a class A reduction from a second-degree felony 
because he "didn't want no felony". R. 164 p.22-23. 
25. The trial court did not allow the defense to use any of Mr. Garcia's criminal 
history. R. 164 p.24. 
26. The trial court also granted the defense request to prohibit any reference to the 
nature of the defendant's business (an escort agency) during trial. R.164 p.26-27. 
TRTAT **************************************************** 
27. At trial, Mr. Wanlass indicated that there was one other male associated with 
Mr. Hoskins during this incident, and described this other male as "a pretty good sized 
guy".R.149p.4. 
28. Mr. Wanlass testified that Mr. Hoskins hit him when the two of them were 
standing face-to-face. R. 149 p.6. 
29. Mr. Wanlass testified that he was sure that it was Mr. Hoskins that hit him, 
with Hoskins's right hand to Wanlass's left side of his face in his mouth. Mr. Wanlass 
was unable to recall whether the other male did anything. R.149 p.7. 
7 
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30. Mr. Wanlass recited the injuries received during this event: a scar to his bottom 
lip, loss of feeling to his bottom lip, and four "busted" teeth broken off at the gum line. 
R.149 p.7-8. 
31. Mr. Wanlass admitted to the two charges that had him in jail at the time of trial 
and also to the previous felony joyriding conviction while on the stand. R. 149 p.22. 
32. Angela Montoya was sworn and testified as a city witness. R.149 p.26. 
33. Ms. Montoya testified that she "saw a large African American man push a 
Caucasian man into a car". R.149 p.27. 
34. She indicated that she saw two black men fighting a white man, but that she 
did not see the other black male touch the white male. R. 149 p.28. 
35. She testified that the victim male had hit a car, his back to the car, that he fell 
i 
on his rear end, that the guy who had pushed him started kicking him, and at that point 
she stopped watching and went inside her workplace. R.149 p.29. 
1 
36. Testimony indicated that she observed this from a distance of forty-five feet. 
R.149 p.30. 
37. Jesse L. Garcia II was sworn and testified as a city witness. R.149 p.32. J 
38. Mr. Garcia testified he watched the altercation from his balcony, observing two 
males arguing with his neighbor. He described them as black males, one a decent size guy 
and the other a "pretty big man" weighing at least 250. R. 149 p.33. 
39. Mr. Garcia testifies that he sees "All of a sudden out of the middle of nowhere 
8 
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the big guy just hits [Mr. Wanlass] in his mouth and then the other dude, they both just 
start socking him and [Mr. Wanlass] falls to the ground." Mr. Garcia indicates that he 
watches this from a distance of approximately thirteen (13) feet. He has a front view of 
Mr. Wanlass and a back view of the other two men. R. 149 p.34-35. 
40. Mr. Garcia was asked how he could be sure that the defendant Mr. Hoskins 
was one of the two men he saw assault Mr. Wanlass. He responded: "Because after they 
was done giving Lee [Wanlass] a real good butt-whipping, the guy turned around and 
(inaudible) all of us and said, 'You guys testify, take this to court, you will be dealt 
with.'"R.149p.37. 
41. Mr. Garcia indicated that the other male, not Mr. Hoskins, struck Mr. Wanlass 
first. Then, Mr. Hoskins struck Mr. Wanlass immediately after, and before he lost his 
footing. R. 149 p.38. 
42. Mr. Garcia testified that once Mr. Wanlass went to the ground, both males 
kicked Mr. Wanlass while he was down. Mr. Garcia stated specifically that Mr. Hoskins 
had kicked Mr. Wanlass in his chest, in the ribs. R. 149 p.39. 
43. Mr. Garcia testified that the larger male hit Mr. Wanlass ten to fifteen times, 
while the smaller male (Mr. Hoskins, by Mr. Garcia's testimony) struck him five to ten 
times. He testified that each of the assailants kicked Mr. Wanlass three or four times. 
R.149p.42. 
44. Roy Benjamin Hoskins, the defendant, was sworn and testified on his own 
9 
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behalf. R. 149 p.47. 
45. Mr. Hoskins testified: "Actually that made five of us because he [Lee Wanlass] 
was walking with a young lady. The young lady that I was looking for to do damage to, 
he was walking with her. That's who he testified that he said he was walking from the 
store with." Mr. McCullough then asked: "Now hold it. Mr. Hoskins, were you looking 
for this young lady to do damage to her?" Mr. Hoskins responded: "No, sir." R.149 p.51. 
46. Mr. Hoskins testified: "The argument continued on. I was standing on the 
steps. There was a young lady [previous witness Ms. Montoya] that said that there was a 
really big gentleman. I may have looked pretty big because I was standing on the top step 
in between the apartment complex and the parking lot and I was standing up on that step 
talking to them and he [Lee Wanlass] was down on the very bottom step so I may have 
looked like the same height as him [Lee Wanlass] or, you know, possibly or whatnot." 
R.149p.52. 
47. Mr. Hoskins characterized the other male as a "little bit" bigger than himself. 
R.149 p.53. 
48. Mr. Hoskins testified that he was the only African American male in the 
immediate area until after both he and Lee Wanlass had gone to the ground. R.149 p.55. 
49. Mr. Hoskins testified that Lee Wanlass grabbed him, that he stood his ground, 
and when he stood his ground he slipped off the steps. R. 149 p.60. 
50. Mr. Hoskins testified that he did not later tell the police detective that he had 
10 
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elbowed someone into a car. He stated that he told the police detective "the exact same 
thing I just told you, right now, the exact same thing, word for word." R. 149 p.61. 
51. Detective Cordon Parks was sworn and testified on rebuttal for the city. R.149 
P-62-
52. Detective Cordon Parks indicated that eleven days after this incident, he had 
interviewed Mr. Hoskins who claimed that he was struck in the face first, and then that he 
elbowed somebody into a car in self-defense. R.149 pp.64-65. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's determination to not admit the prior felony burglary convictions 
was in error. However, a review of the evidence in the case demonstrates that "there is no 
reasonable likelihood there would have been a more favorable result for defendant absent 
the trial court's error." State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1140 (Utah 1989). 
VI. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT RULED INCORRECTLY REGARDING THE 
APPLICATION OF URE 609 IN THIS CASE. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 states: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness: 
(a)(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403. if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the under 
which witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been 
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to 
the accused; and 
11 
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(a)(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The wording of URE 609(a)(1) itself does not make it clear that the URE 403 
balancing test referred to applies only to the interests of the defendant. The Advisory 
Committee Note to the rule does state however that the rule grants "the court discretion in 
convictions not involving dishonesty or false statement to refuse to admit the evidence if 
it would be prejudicial to the defendant. Current Utah law [meaning the law prior to the 
change in the rule] mandates the admission of such evidence." URE 609, Advisory 
Committee Note, 1992 Amendment, amended effective October 1, 1992, (2004 Ed.). 
i t appears from the record that both the trial court and the prosecution 
misinterpreted the correct application of URE 609(a)(1) with regard to a government 
witness, as opposed to a defendant. It is noteworthy that defense counsel did not cite 
specifically to Utah Rule of Evidence 609 in his second motion in limine, referring only 
to "the admissibility of evidence of previous convictions on the part of the alleged victim" 
and stating "Defendant believes that all or most of those convictions involve crimes of 
dishonesty." R.38-39. Defense counsel provided no substantive argument or analysis 
regarding URE 609 at the motion hearing. R.164. Further, defense counsel provided to 
case law or analysis of what constitutes a crime of dishonesty. 
The misunderstanding is clarified based on a review of State v. Smith, 817 P.2d 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
828 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). That case deals squarely with the issue of "evidence of prior 
convictions" of a government witness: 
At issue is whether the rule's limitation on prejudicial effect is designed to 
protect only the defendant, or any witness. The Utah rule is identical to its 
federal counterpart nl and therefore federal interpretations of the rule are 
persuasive. See Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 806 P.2d 235, 237 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1991). While the federal appeals courts have not been consistent in 
answering whom the rule is intended to protect, the Supreme Court resolved 
the conflict in Green v. Bock Laundry Mack Co., 490 U.S. 504, 109 S.Ct. 
1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989). n2 The Court stated that "the Rule was 
meant to authorize a judge to weigh against prejudice against no one other 
than a criminal defendant [,]" id. at 1991, and concluded that impeaching 
evidence which is detrimental to the prosecution in a criminal case shall be 
admitted without any balancing of its probativeness and prejudicial effect. 
See id. at 1984. See also 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence para. 609[04] at 609-94 (1990) ("The rule on 
prejudice does not apply if the defense offers the conviction."). 
Smith, 817 P.2d at 829. 
However, failure to admit prior convictions does not require reversal and remand 
for a new trial: 
In the [Smith] case, the trial judge did not allow defendant to cross-examine 
[the government's witness] about [the government witness's] prior theft 
convictions because the evidence was prejudicial to [the government's 
witness]. This was error. Although we "will not reverse a trial court's 
evidentiary ruling unless it is manifest that 'the court so abused its 
discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted[,]'" Holtman, 806 
P.2d at 237 (quoting State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987)), in 
this instance [the government witness's] testimony was critically important 
to the prosecution and was the only evidence contradicting defendant's 
testimony regarding intent. Therefore, absent this error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant. * * * * 
Smith, 817 P.2d at 829-830. 
13 
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The corollary is that where the witness's testimony is not critically important to the 
prosecution, and where there is other evidence contradicting the defendant, there should 
not be a reversal if there is not a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
defendant. Lee Wanlass's testimony was important to the government's case and the 
resulting conviction, but it was not crucial. Mr. Wanlass's testimony was not the only 
evidence contradicting the defendant's testimony. Indeed, with the other available 
witnesses, the government could have proceeded to trial even without Mr. Wanlass. Mr. 
Garcia's testimony was sufficient to try and convict Mr. Hoskins of the charge of simple 
assault. The interplay between the testimony of Ms. Montoya, Mr. Hoskins, and 
Detective Parks ultimately reinforced Mr. Garcia's testimony, providing a basis for the 
jury decision of simple assault. Given the weight of the evidence in this case, there is not 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant. 
B. GIVEN THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL, ADMISSION OF THE BURGLARY 
PRIORS WOULD NOT CREATE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF A 
MORE FAVORABLE OUTCOME FOR DEFENDANT, 
The Smith court indicated that consideration of the other evidence available to 
contradict the defendant's testimony is crucial in evaluating whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. Smith, 817 P.2d at 830. An 
analysis of that other available evidence follows. 
1, The burglary convictions were contained in a single criminal episode, 
Mr. Wanlass testified that he entered pleas to four third-degree burglaries in 
14 
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September 2000. Those pleas were for burglaries that occurred at the same time in July 
2000 at "Diamond Storage". R.164 p. 13. When defense counsel refers to the four felony 
counts of burglary, it should be noted that those four counts were contained in one Third 
District Court case, 001913285. R.38 (Defendant's Third Motion in Limine). 
The fact that the four counts resulted from one criminal episode and were 
contained in one criminal case further minimizes their potential evidentiary impact and 
impeachment value. These were not four burglaries occurring on four different dates. 
2. The trial court incorrectly described the burglary convictions as offenses of 
dishonesty, 
Mr. Wanlass testified that he entered four separate storage units using bolt cutters 
to take locks off, one of which was his own, that tools and "other off-the-wall things like 
that" were taken out of those storage units. R.164 p. 14. Mr. Wanlass testified that he had 
not tried to get rid of any of the stolen items at the time he was caught (one day to two 
weeks later). R.164 p. 15. Mr. Wanlass testified that his purpose in taking the items was 
"to get money to help the pay bills and do some drugs." R.164 p. 15. On this basis, the 
trial court referred to the burglaries as an act of dishonesty. R.164 p.24. 
Burglary convictions are not necessarily considered to be crimes of dishonesty: 
The trial court ruled that the prior convictions were crimes of dishonesty or 
false statement under Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). It may be claimed 
that nearly all crimes involve some form of dishonesty or false statement. 
However, in State v. Bruce, nlO we held that crimes of theft and burglary 
are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty or false statement within the 
meaning of rule 609(a)(2). Bruce noted that crimes of dishonesty or false 
statement are those which involve "'some element of deceit, untruthfulness, 
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or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.'" 
n i l In most cases, theft is not classified as a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement because it is generally not indicative of a witness's inclination to 
lie. nl2 However, when a prior theft is "committed by fraudulent or 
deceitful means bearing directly on the accused's likelihood to testify 
truthfully," it can be considered a crime of dishonesty or false statement 
under rule 609(a)(2). nl3 
State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1139-40 (Utah 1989). 
Defense counsel adduced no evidence from which the trial court should have made 
a finding that Lee Wanlass's burglary convictions involved dishonesty or false statement. 
Given the evidence, the trial court would not have been able to make a finding of 
dishonesty or false statement as to the burglary convictions. The net result is that based 
on the available record, the record generated by defense counsel questioning of the 
government witness, the trial court should not have suggested that burglary was an 
offense of dishonesty or false statement. Based on the evidence brought out at the 
evidentiary hearing on the motion in limine, there is no suggestion that the convictions 
would have provided any additional impeachment value to the defense. 
3. Direct testimony of the victim Lee Wanlass, 
It is important to note that the City's victim witness Lee Wanlass testified at trial in 
a jail jumpsuit with handcuffs on. R.164 p.24-25. Further, he admitted to having had a 
methamphetamine problem. R.164 p. 17. 
At trial, Mr. Wanlass indicated that there was one other male associated with Mr. 
Hoskins during this incident, and described this other male as "a pretty good sized guy". 
16 
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R.149 pA 
Mr. Wanlass testified that Mr. Hoskins hit him when the two of them were 
standing face-to-face. R.149 p.6. 
Mr. Wanlass testified that he was sure that it was Mr. Hoskins that hit him, with 
Hoskin's right hand to Wanlass's left side of his face in his mouth. Mr. Wanlass was 
unable to recall whether the other male did anything. R. 149 p.7. 
Mr. Wanlass recited the injuries received during this event: a scar to his bottom lip, 
loss of feeling to his bottom lip, and four "busted" teeth broken off at the gum line. R.149 
p.7-8. 
Mr. Wanlass admitted to the two charges that had him in jail at the time of trial and 
also to the previous felony joyriding conviction while on the witness stand before the 
jury. R.149 p.22. 
4. Direct Testimony of witness Ms. Montoya 
Angela Montoya was sworn and testified as a city witness. R. 149 p.26. 
Ms. Montoya testified that she "saw a large African American man push a 
Caucasian man into a car". R.149 p.27. 
She indicated that she saw two black men fighting a white man, but that she did 
not see the other black male (as opposed to the one she described as "large") touch the 
white male. R.149 p.28. 
She testified that the victim male had hit a car, his back to the car, that he fell on 
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his rear end, that the large male who had pushed him started kicking him, and at that point 
she stopped watching and went inside her workplace. R. 149 p.29. 
Testimony indicated that she observed this from a distance of forty-five feet. R.149 
p.30. Ms. Montoya's testimony was more in agreement with Mr. Garcia's testimony than 
Mr. Wanlass's, identifying the larger male of the two as the initial assailant. 
Mr. Hoskins later testified: "The argument continued on. I was standing on the 
steps. There was a young lady [previous witness Ms. Montoya] that said that there was a 
really big gentleman. I may have looked pretty big because I was standing on the top step 
in between the apartment complex and the parking lot and I was standing up on that step 
talking to them and he [Lee Wanlass] was down on the very bottom step so I may have 
looked like the same height as him [Lee Wanlass] or, you know, possibly or whatnot." 
R.149/52. 
Mr. Hoskins' testimony was trying to explain why Ms. Montoya thought he looked 
larger at the time - Ms. Montoya said there were two males of different size confronting 
the victim, where Mr. Hoskins' story was that he was the only African-American male 
present until both he and Lee Wanlass were both on the ground. On this point, Mr. 
Hoskins was trying to explain the clear contradiction between Montoya and Garcia and 
his story as to the presence of the other male. This could have diminished his credibility 
in the eyes of the jury as well. 
5. Direct Testimony of witness Mr, Garcia 
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Jesse L. Garcia II was sworn and testified as a city witness. R.149 p.32. Mr. 
Garcia testified that he had "come over from the jail with Mr. Wanlass" but had not 
discussed his testimony with Mr. Wanlass. R.149 p.44. Although not explicitly set out in 
the record, it is important to note that Mr. Garcia was attired similarly to Mr. Wanlass: 
jail jumpsuit and handcuffs. 
Mr. Garcia testified he initially watched the altercation from his balcony, 
observing two males arguing with his neighbor. He described them as black males, one a 
decent size guy and the other a "pretty big man" weighing at least 250. R.149 p.33. 
Mr. Garcia testifies that he sees "All of a sudden out of the middle of nowhere the 
big guy just hits [Mr. Wanlass] in his mouth and then the other dude, they both just start 
socking him and [Mr. Wanlass] falls to the ground." Mr. Garcia indicates that he watches 
this from a distance of approximately thirteen (13) feet. He has a front view of Mr. 
Wanlass and a back view of the other two men. R.149 p.34-35. 
Mr. Garcia was asked how he could be sure that the defendant Mr. Hoskins was 
one of the two men he saw assault Lee Wanlass. He responded: "Because after they was 
done giving Lee [Wanlass] a real good butt-whipping, the guy turned around and 
(inaudible) all of us and said, 'You guys testify, take this to court, you will be dealt 
with.'" R.149 p.37. Mr. Garcia was sure that person was Mr. Hoskins. 
Mr. Garcia indicated that the other male, not Mr. Hoskins, struck Mr. Wanlass 
first. Then, Mr. Hoskins struck Mr. Wanlass immediately after, and before he lost his 
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footing. R.149 p.38. While this was in conflict with Mr. Wanlass's testimony, it was 
largely in agreement with the testimony of Ms. Montoya. 
Mr. Garcia testified that once Mr. Wanlass went to the ground, both males kicked 
Mr. Wanlass while he was down. Mr. Garcia stated specifically that Mr. Hoskins had 
kicked Mr. Wanlass in his chest, in the ribs. R. 149 p.39. 
Mr. Garcia testified that the larger male hit Mr. Wanlass ten to fifteen times, while 
the smaller male (Mr. Hoskins, by Mr. Garcia's testimony) struck him five to ten times. 
He testified that each of the assailants kicked Mr. Wanlass three or four times. R.149 
p.42. 
6. Direct Testimony of the defendant Mr, Hoskins, 
Roy Benjamin Hoskins, the defendant, was sworn and testified on his own behalf. 
R.149p.47. 
Mr. Hoskins testified: "Actually that made five of us because he [Lee Wanlass] 
was walking with a young lady. The young lady that I was looking for to do damage to, 
he was walking with her. That's who he testified that he said he was walking from the 
store with." Mr. McCullough then asked: "Now hold it. Mr. Hoskins, were you looking 
for this young lady to do damage to her?" Mr. Hoskins responded: "No, sir." R.149 p.51. 
The comment about a "young lady [Mr. Hoskins] was looking for to do damage to", 
combined with an immediate retraction at the urging of his defense counsel, must have 
brought Mr. Hoskins'credibility into question with the jury. 
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Mr. Hoskins testified: "The argument continued on. I was standing on the steps. 
There was a young lady [previous witness Ms. Montoya] that said that there was a really 
big gentleman. I may have looked pretty big because I was standing on the top step in 
between the apartment complex and the parking lot and I was standing up on that step 
talking to them and he [Lee Wanlass] was down on the very bottom step so I may have 
looked like the same height as him [Lee Wanlass] or, you know, possibly or whatnot." 
R.149 p.52. 
In the eyes of the jury, this testimony may have resolved any conflict between Mr. 
Wanlass, Ms. Montoya, and Mr. Garcia. It provides a basis on which to Ms. Montoya 
could have mistaken Mr. Hoskins as a larger male. It provides a basis explaining why 
Mr. Garcia might have been confused as to who struck Mr. Wanlass first, if Mr. Wanlass 
was correct in asserting that Mr. Hoskins struck first. 
Mr. Hoskins characterized the other male as a "little bit" bigger than himself. 
R.149 p.53. 
Mr. Hoskins testified that he was the only African American male in the 
immediate area until after both he and Lee Wanlass had gone to the ground. R.149 p.55. 
This was in direct contradiction to the testimony of Mr. Wanlass (R.149 p.4), Ms. 
Montoya (R.149 p.28), and Mr. Garcia (R.149 p.33-35). This testimony could have raised 
additional questions in the eyes of the jury as to Mr. Hoskins'credibility. 
Mr. Hoskins testified that Lee Wanlass grabbed him, that he stood his ground, and 
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when he stood his ground he slipped off the steps. R.149 p.60. Mr. Garcia had testified 
that the other male, not Mr. Hoskins, struck Mr. Wanlass first. Then, Mr. Hoskins struck 
Mr. Wanlass immediately after, and before he lost his footing. R.149 p.38. 
Mr. Garcia testified that once Mr. Wanlass went to the ground, both males kicked 
Mr. Wanlass while he was down. Mr. Garcia stated specifically that Mr. Hoskins had 
kicked Mr. Wanlass in his chest, in the ribs. R.149 p.39. This testimony by itself was 
sufficient to meet the elements of simple assault. That was the charge to which the jury 
returned a conviction. R.93. While there may have been some confusion among the 
witnesses as to which of the two men hit Lee Wanlass first, or which caused the 
substantial injury (R83,84), the jury resolved that confusion by returning a verdict of guilt 
to the lesser included offense (R.85A) of simple assault (R.86). 
Mr. Hoskins testified that he did not later tell the police detective that he had 
elbowed someone into a car. He stated that he told the police detective "the exact same 
thing I just told you, right now, the exact same thing, word for word." R. 149 p.61. 
7. Direct Testimony of Detective Parks. 
Detective Cordon Parks was sworn and testified on rebuttal for the city. R.149 
p.62. Detective Cordon Parks indicated that eleven days after this incident, he had 
interviewed Mr. Hoskins who claimed that he was struck in the face first, and then that he 
elbowed somebody into a car in self-defense. R.149 p.64-65. Mr. Hoskins's testimony on 
the day of trial was he had been grabbed by Mr. Wanlass, not struck in the face, and 
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denied elbowing anyone. The detective's testimony, set off against Mr. Hoskins', raised 
further questions about the defendant's credibility. 
Consideration of the other evidence available to contradict the defendant's 
testimony in this case indicates that substantial evidence supporting the jury's 
determination was present. That evidence demonstrates that there was NOT a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. Smith, 817 P.2d at 830. 
The ultimate determination of the jury shows that they considered the evidence and 
made a deliberate, informed decision. Presented with the first option of assault causing 
substantial injury, the jury rendered a verdict convicting the defendant of the lesser-
included-offense of simple assault. This means that the jury either discounted Mr. 
Wanlass's testimony about the nature and source of his injuries, or that they were unable 
to determine which of the two men assaulting Mr. Wanlass could be held accountable for 
the injuries. 
In light of the substantial evidence supporting the simple assault conviction, there 
is not a likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant if the burglary convictions 
are admitted. "The Utah Supreme Court has stated, 'for an error to require reversal, the 
likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
the verdict.'" State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Utah App. 1989). Further, 
While the trial court erred in admitting defendant's 1985 theft 
conviction, the error was harmless. Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." In 
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dealing with nonconstitutional error, "we will not reverse a conviction 
unless the error is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more 
favorable result for the defendant." nl4 Considering all of the 
circumstances in this case and the evidence against defendant, there is no 
reasonable likelihood there would have been a more favorable result for 
defendant absent the trial court's error. 
State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135.1140 (Utah 1989). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's determination that the victim's prior felony burglary convictions 
were not admissible was in error. 
However, a review of the evidence available at trial demonstrates that there was 
not a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant, absent the 
error. 
The City respectfully requests that this court deny the defendant's appeal, allowing 
the defendant's conviction to stand upon remand to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^£> day of ^ ^ ^
 ? 2004. 
SCOTFA. FISHER (SBJ0728) 
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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